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Abstract: This article analyzes Brazilian civil–military relations using a 
framework that directs attention to the institutions of not only democratic 
civilian control, but also of military effectiveness and efficiency. The article 
argues that democratic civilian control over the armed forces in Brazil is 
exercised by a wide variety of mechanisms, many of which are not specifical-
ly designed for this purpose, but are instead part of a vast array of institu-
tions that exercise control and oversight over public bureaucracies in gen-
eral. Military prerogatives that were once high are now moderate or low, and 
there is currently no question of civilian control of the armed forces. How-
ever, several questions remain regarding the effectiveness of the armed forc-
es. The article also emphasizes the importance of civilian staff assuming 
responsibilities in defense, as they have in virtually all other areas of gov-
ernment policy. 
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Introduction 
The literature on civil–military relations is rich, especially as it relates to 
the important case of Brazil. This article1 seeks to contribute to that 
literature by reassessing the level of civilian control of the military in 
Brazil. However, focusing solely on control is inadequate. As David 
Pion-Berlin stated, “If democracy is to survive and flourish in today’s 
world, it must strike a balance between controlling the armed forces and 
ensuring their effectiveness” (Pion-Berlin 2006: ix). 
Therefore, we also analyze Brazil’s civil-military relations utilizing a 
conceptual framework that we believe captures not only the status of the 
armed forces within the democratic regime, but also the capabilities of 
the armed forces; that is, their effectiveness. Finally, we examine effi-
ciency, which we define as the presence of institutions that a state can 
employ to monitor and control expenditures of public resources. We 
believe that our analysis will allow researchers to better understand the 
current reality of Brazilian civil–military relations.  
Our analysis finds its origins in Max Weber’s work on the relation-
ship between political power and bureaucracy.2 We use a modern version 
of that theory, New Institutionalism. The question is not whether institu-
tions matter, but how they matter and in what circumstances. For the 
purposes of this article, we will use the following definition of institu-
tions: “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions 
embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political econ-
omy” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 936).  
Our assumption is that as dynamics change within a polity, so do 
institutions. It is important to examine the relationship between institu-
tions in order to understand political power – which is, after all, a rela-
tional concept. In the case of Brazil, much has changed since the military 
gave up power in 1985 and moved from being the government to an 
institution. What has changed? What institutions have emerged in the 
power relationship between civilians and the military, and how have they 
affected our understanding of control, effectiveness, and efficiency?  
  
                                                 
1  The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone and do not necessarily 
represent those of the Department of Navy or the Department of Defense. 
2  We elaborate on this point in Bruneau and Tollefson 2006: 5–8. 
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The Need for Analysis  
The available literature in English on the topic of civil–military relations 
in Brazil is somewhat polemical. Some authors, including Jorge Zave-
rucha and Flávio Da Cunha Rezende (2009), emphasize continuity with 
the non-democratic past, 1964 until 1985, when the military was the 
government. Other authors, such as Wendy Hunter (1997), highlight the 
break of the military from the past in the context of democratic politics.3 
Additionally, while there is much recent literature in English on national 
aspirations, defense policy, and the like, with an emphasis on Brazil ulti-
mately overcoming the legacy of “the land of the future, and always will 
be,” this literature fails to deal with the institutions – the structures and 
processes of national defense – through which the State could imple-
ment the published strategies and fulfill its stated aspirations.4 
It is commonplace to state, as President Lula did in 2003, that Brazil 
is ready to “assume its greatness” (Brands 2010: 6). A huge outpouring 
of reports and documents has presented Brazil as a regional, if not glob-
al, actor; one of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries; an 
important interlocutor with the United States; and more. For example, 
on 21 November 2010, the then-US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, 
and the Brazilian Minister of Defense, Nelson Jobim, signed a Security 
of Military Information Agreement. Recent significant US government 
documents have highlighted Brazil’s importance. As President Barack 
Obama’s National Security Strategy stated, “We welcome Brazil’s leadership 
and seek to move beyond dated North-South divisions to pursue pro-
gress on bilateral, hemispheric, and global issues” (2010: 44). In their 
most recent twenty-year prospective, the US National Intelligence Coun-
cil stated, “Brazil will play an outsized role on the region’s future. Its 
resources and scale could offer benefits and insulation others lack” (Na-
tional Intelligence Council 2012: 82). In addition to the Congressional 
Research Service, which issues periodic reports on Brazil, many im-
                                                 
3  For the former perspective, see also Martins Filho and Zirker (1996 and 2008). 
For the latter perspective, see also Castro and D’Araujo 2001: Introdução. New 
and high-quality analysis in Portuguese and Spanish includes D’Araujo, Fuccille, 
and Saint Pierre.  
4  For example, the work of Joám Evans Pim, entitled Brazilian Defence Policies: 
Current Trends and Regional Implications, is informative. However, it provides min-
imal information on what instruments Brazil has available to implement a mili-
tary or defense strategy. More recently, Daniel Flemes and Alcides Costa Vaz 
(2011) published Security Policies of India, Brazil and South Africa – Regional Security 
Contexts as Constraints for a Common Agenda, which neglects information on Bra-
zilian military capabilities. 
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portant US and European think tanks and non-governmental organiza-
tions have published reports heralding Brazil’s emergence into greatness 
as a country with the fifth largest landmass and population and the sixth 
largest economy in the world (see, for example, the works of Meyer 
2013; Einaudi 2011; Flemes and Costa Vaz 2011). 
Until the mid-1990s, the Brazilian government made few official 
statements on national defense. According to President Fernando Hen-
rique Cardoso, “in 1996, for the first time in Brazilian history, the basics 
of National Defense Policy were defined” (Cardoso 2002: 333). Since 
then, the Brazilian Government has published three documents dealing 
with civil–military relations and national defense. The first was the Estra-
tégia Nacional de Defesa (END), or National Defense Strategy, a decree law 
drafted by Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim and Minister of Strategic 
Affairs Roberto Mangabeira Unger and signed by President Lula in De-
cember 2008, and updated in 2012. This was followed by the Política 
Nacional de Defesa, or National Defense Policy, drafted by Minister of 
Defense Celso Amorim. Most recently, Minister Amorim drafted the 
Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional, or White Book of National Defense. These 
three documents were presented by President Dilma Rousseff to the 
Brazilian Congress in early 2012. The documents, one following after 
another, are a major change since the political transition in 1985. 
There is indeed much going on in Brazil pertaining to the general 
areas of national defense. The Brazilian Navy is currently building a 
nuclear-powered submarine and there is a new law pertaining to the 
defense industry with potentially large implications for domestic firms. 
Brazil’s hosting of two of the most important global events, the FIFA 
World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016, has obvious implications 
for the use of national defense institutions, technology, and deployed 
military personnel during these events. The armed forces have been 
playing a role in pacifying the favelas in Rio de Janeiro in anticipation of 
these events. Brazil was the leading promoter and principal founder of 
both the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the South 
American Defense Council, with the latter created in Salvador, Bahia, on 
16 December 2008.  
In the context of democratic Brazil, it is very significant that there 
has been a major increase in scholarly and popular interest in issues of 
national defense. The evidence includes the Frente Parlamentar de Defe-
sa, which had 120 members in the 2014 legislature. The Pro-Defesa 
program of the Ministério da Educação e Cultura (MEC), the Ministry of 
Education and Culture, and the Ministry of Defense (MOD), encourages 
and provides funding for joint projects between military and civilian 
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educational institutions. In addition, there has been a great increase in 
the number of military officers obtaining advanced degrees (masters and 
doctorates), and civilian professors and students engaged in topics of 
national defense. An epistemic community is emerging in Brazil that is 
focused on issues of security and defense, both domestically and region-
ally. The Associação Brasileira de Estudos de Defesa (ABED; Brazilian 
Association of Defense Studies), which was founded in October 2005, 
has held annual conferences in São Carlos (2007), Niterói (2008), Lon-
drina (2009), Brasília (2010), Fortaleza (2011), São Paulo (2012), and 
Belém (August 2013). The 2012 conference, held in São Paulo, had over 
700 attendees. Recently, ABED began publishing a journal, the Revista 
Brasileira de Estudos de Defesa. 
There are currently two centers, in Niterói and Porto Alegre, that 
are formally recognized by Coordenação de Aperfeicoamento de Pessoal 
de Nível Superior (CAPES), (Coordination for the Improvement of 
Higher Education Personnel), in the MEC, specializing in themes of 
national defense. There are several other similar programs that have not 
yet been formally recognized. In addition, there are at least half a dozen 
non-governmental blogs that deal with national defense. The Revista 
Eletrônica de Estratégia Brasileira de Segurança e Defesa (The Electronic Journal of 
Brazilian Security and Defense Strategy) is one of the many publications that 
discusses issues of defense and security. Today, there is unprecedented 
interest in the executive and legislative level, among Brazilian society and 
academia, and among observers abroad on issues concerning national 
defense; all of this is taking place in the context of a democracy. As far as 
we can ascertain, however, even with this recent attention and activity, 
the analysis of civil – military relations in Brazil does not extend beyond 
a narrow focus on control.  
Democratic Consolidation in Brazil 
Despite early negative prognoses by prominent scholars regarding the 
(poor) potential for democratic consolidation in Brazil, there is no doubt 
that Brazil today is a consolidated democracy. Examples of pessimism 
include Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, who bluntly stated that “Brazil is 
a case of unconsolidated democracy” (1996: 187). Also, Terry Karl and 
Philippe Schmitter stated, “In the former four cases [Brazil, Ecuador, 
Paraguay and Turkey], the transition has been drawn out, real limits have 
been placed on the extent of democratization, and consolidation seems 
very difficult to reach” (1991: 280).  
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The current democratic consolidation can be documented in any 
number of different ways. Since the establishment of the Constituent 
Assembly, which resulted in the Constitution of 1988, virtually all of the 
amendments have been in the direction of further democratic consolida-
tion.5 Bruneau is happy that in his writing in the late 1980s he did not 
rule out the positive democratization that would later take place. Bru-
neau stated, “it seems likely that Brazilian democracy will continue on its 
haphazard and complex journey with much attention and energy devoted 
to political activities” (Bruneau 1991: 279). Indeed, it has.  
There have been free and fair elections since the 1988 Constitution 
for all levels of government in this federative republic. Presidential elec-
tions were held in 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010, with further 
elections also scheduled for late 2014. Congressional elections were held 
in 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010, and are also scheduled for 
2014. The National Congress is bi-cameral. The 513 members of the 
Chamber of Deputies (Câmara dos Deputados) are elected for four-year 
terms. The 81 Senators from the Federal Senate (Senado Federal) are 
elected for eight-year terms, with one-third of the Senate seats deter-
mined in a Congressional election, followed by two-thirds in the subse-
quent election. Elections at the gubernatorial, state, and municipal level 
were held in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012, and gubernatorial 
elections are scheduled for 2014.  
The rigor and transparency of Brazil’s electoral system is the envy 
of many older democracies. Power at the presidential level has been 
transferred from an upper-class moderate Social Democrat, Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, to a lower-class member of the Workers’ Party (Par-
tido dos Trabalhadores, PT), Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, and then to a 
former insurgent against the military regime, Dilma Rousseff, also from 
the PT. Voter participation in the presidential and congressional elec-
tions has been uniformly high since 1990, hovering around the 80 per-
cent mark. In the 2010 elections, the voter turnout was 78.50 percent for 
the Presidency, and 81.88 percent for Congress (International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). However, it should be noted 
that voting is compulsory in Brazil.  
On 25 October 2011, Brazil’s Senate passed the Freedom of Infor-
mation Law. According to Freedom House, this was a:  
landmark step towards improving press freedom in Brazil. The bill 
would secure citizens the right to information on public agencies, 
                                                 
5  For extensive details on this expanding process of democratization, see the 
chapter by Sadek and Cavalcanti (2003).  
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including budgets, salaries, staffing, and internal reports, as well as 
protections to whistleblowers (Freedom House 2011). 
Under President Rousseff, Brazil created a Truth Commission to investi-
gate alleged human rights abuses (torture, forced disappearances, mur-
ders, and other violations) between 1964 and 1985. The seven-member 
panel was given two years to look into cases of torture and tasked with 
issuing a report. The Commission has been given complete access to 
government documents, has broad subpoena powers, and can name 
those who violated human rights. However, the Commission lacks pros-
ecutorial power, and is limited by the 1979 Amnesty Law (Freedom 
House 2012). 
Freedom House ranks Brazil “free” in terms of political rights and 
civil liberties (Freedom House 2013). In short, there is currently no 
doubt that Brazil is a consolidated democracy, and, that democracy is 
deepening. Civil–military relations have evolved in the context of this 
broad democratic deepening. 
A central element of the democratic deepening is the diminishment 
of the military prerogatives, so usefully formulated for comparative pur-
poses by Alfred Stepan in his influential book entitled Rethinking Military 
Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (1988). It seems obvious, at least in 
retrospect, that politicians have several incentives to diminish the pre-
rogatives of the military, thereby increasing their own power, as elected 
representatives, and those of the civilian institutions they have created 
and in which they operate. In our view, Wendy Hunter had it right: 
Elected civilian politicians have incentives to whittle down military pre-
rogatives, which they did (Hunter 1997). 
Stepan ranked military prerogatives in Brazil as “high”; indeed, 
higher than the other countries he analyzed, which included Argentina, 
Spain, and Uruguay (Stepan 1988: 122).6 Today, more than 25 years later, 
if we look at his eleven prerogatives we find a very different situation, in 
which most of the military prerogatives are actually low. In all cases, we 
see a tremendous emphasis on legal instruments – the 1988 Constitution 
and subsequent laws, as Brazilians seek to overcome the arbitrary and, at 
the most generous, formally legal workings of the military regime.7 The 
following section briefly examines the eleven military prerogatives.  
                                                 
6  It should be noted that Zaverucha (2000: 37) reviews 15 prerogatives and 
updates Stepan’s analysis without finding much difference from 1988. 
7  It is noteworthy that the organizational chart of the Ministry of Defense lists at 
the top of the page the legal bases for the ministry. See Ministério da Defesa 
(2014). 
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Table 1:  Selected Prerogatives of Military as Institution in a Democratic 
Regime, Brazil from 1946 to 2014 



































High High High High Low 
2 Military rela-
tionship to the 
chief executive 




High High High High Moderate 
4 Active-duty 
military partic-
ipation in the 
Cabinet 
High High High High Low 
5 Role of mili-
tary vis a vis 
legislature 
Moderate High High High Low 





High High High High Moderate 
7 Role in intelli-
gence Moderate High High High Moderate 
8 Role in police Moderate High High Moderate Moderate 
9 Role in mili-
tary promo-
tions 
Moderate High Moderate High Moderate 
10 Role in state 
enterprises Moderate High High Moderate Low 
11 Role in legal 
system Moderate High High High Low 
Source:  Adapted from Stepan 1988: 93–114, especially table 7.1 and page 103. “Close 
to high” for 1969–1972 is interpreted as “high”. For 1985–1987, variables 8 
and 10 “were reduced” (page 103) according to Stepan, and are placed here in 
the moderate category. Authors’ update based on documents and interviews in 
Brazil with civilians and military officers in 2012 and 2013, and by e-mail in 
2014.  
Prerogative #1: Constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the 
military in political system. According to Stepan, this prerogative is low 
when “Military actions to bolster internal security are only undertaken 
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when ordered by the appropriate executive official within a framework 
established by legal system and the legislature” (Stepan 1988: 94). Today, 
Brazil’s rating in this category is low. Many of the changes in military 
prerogatives result from the founding of a civilian-led Ministry of De-
fense (MOD) by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso by Complemen-
tary Law 97 of 9 June 1999. The armed services no longer enjoy cabinet 
rank and are now under the MOD. The fact that the MOD was created 
by a complementary law is very important since this type of law requires 
that both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies pass the law by abso-
lute majorities which is 50 percent plus one vote (which meant 257 out 
of 513 in the Chamber, 42 out of 81 in the Senate), and then signed by 
the president. More recently, the MOD’s powers were expanded and 
further specified in Complementary Law 136 of 25 August 2010.  
Prerogative #2: Military relationship to the chief executive. Stepan 
wrote that this prerogative is low when “Chief executive (president, 
prime minister, or constitutional monarch) is de jure and de facto com-
mander-in-chief” (Stepan 1988: 94). This prerogative is also currently 
low in Brazil. Since 1985, all of Brazil’s presidents have been civilians. 
Since 1989, the presidents have been elected by the population in nation-
al elections every four years. The MOD, headed by a civilian, channels 
demands from the armed services.  
Prerogative #3: Coordination of defense sector. To Stepan, this 
prerogative is low when that coordination is done:  
De jure and de facto […] by Cabinet-level official (normally a ci-
vilian appointed by chief executive) who controls a staff with ex-
tensive participation by professional civil servants or civilian polit-
ical appointees (Stepan 1988: 94). 
The military maintains “moderate” prerogatives in this area in Brazil due 
to the paucity of civilian expertise in the MOD. Insofar as the coordina-
tion of the defense sector is defined by the central documents on nation-
al defense, it is the civilians who take the lead. This responsibility is made 
very clear in Complementary Law 136 of 25 August 2010, and it should 
be noted that the Strategic Defense Strategy (END) was the responsibil-
ity of two civilians: Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim, and the Minister 
of Strategic Affairs, Roberto Mangabeira Unger. According to a long-
time military observer of Brazil, “[T]he National Strategic Defense Plan 
[END] is the most significant expression of civilian control of the mili-
tary in Brazil” (Linwood Ham 2009: 26). 
Prerogative #4: Active duty military participation in the Cabinet. 
This prerogative is low, in Stepan’s analysis, when there is normally no 
active duty military participation in the cabinet (Stepan 1988: 95). This 
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rating is currently low in Brazil. Of the 27 members of the current cabi-
net, none is military. The minister of defense is a civilian. Furthermore, 
the president herself, Dilma Rousseff, and the minister of sports, Aldo 
Rebelo, had been insurgents against the military regime of 1964–1985. 
Only one of the fourteen officials in the expanded cabinet, the head of 
the Secretariat for Institutional Security, GSI, is a member of the military 
– and a retired one at that (army general), with no uniform and with no 
ministry.  
Prerogative #5: Role of Legislature. According to Stepan, this pre-
rogative is low when:  
Most major policy issues affecting military budgets, force struc-
ture, and new weapons initiatives are monitored by the legislature. 
Cabinet-level officials and chief aides routinely appear before leg-
islative committees to defend and explain policy initiatives and to 
present legislation (Stepan 1988: 95). 
Today, the role of the Brazilian Congress in all areas of governance, 
including the armed forces, is high, which means the military preroga-
tives are low. All of the key legislation, which implies the commitment in 
allocating funds, must pass both houses of the congress. Then, the Con-
gress calls special investigatory committees to review all issues. Finally, 
all major policies emanating from the MOD are submitted to Congress – 
not for approval, but for review. Any concerns are communicated by 
Congress to the executive branch. 
Prerogative #6: Role of senior career civil servants or civilian politi-
cal appointees. To Stepan, this prerogative is low when a:  
Professional cadre of highly informed civil servants or policy-mak-
ing civilian political appointees play a major role in assisting [the] 
executive branch in designing and implementing defense and na-
tional security policy (Stepan 1988: 95). 
This prerogative is moderate. The civilian bureaucracy in Brazil is une-
quivocally strong. However, as there is no civilian career track, nor the 
required concurso (public academic competition) in the MOD – and with 
few civilians having expertise – the military fills a vacuum and thereby 
assumes larger roles in the MOD itself. The Planning Ministry is the 
entity that could create civilian career positions, but it has not done so to 
date due to a lack of funds. From what we have been able to determine, 
the issue is mostly financial rather than political.  
Prerogative #7: Role in intelligence. For Stepan, this prerogative is 
low when “Peak intelligence agencies [are] de jure and de facto controlled 
by civilian chains of command.” In addition, there are “Strong civilian 
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review boards” (Stepan 1988: 96). This prerogative is also moderate in 
Brazil today. The Serviço Nacional de Informações (SNI) National In-
formation Service, which was the military regime’s intelligence service, 
was abolished by President Collor in 1990. It was replaced in 1999 by the 
Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (ABIN), the Brazilian Intelligence 
Agency, which is led by a civilian who is nominated by the president and 
confirmed by the Senate. However, ABIN reports to the Minister Chief 
of the GSI, who is a general (retired) officer in the Brazilian Army. The 
Brazilian Military Intelligence system is also generally intact.  
Prerogative #8: Role in police. This prerogative is low when, ac-
cording to Stepan, “Police [are] under control of nonmilitary ministry or 
local officials”, and there are “No active-duty military allowed to com-
mand a police unit” (Stepan 1988: 96). This prerogative is moderate in 
Brazil. The control of the Polícia Militar (PM), or Military Police, is a 
state responsibility, under the democratically elected civilian governors of 
the states. The Polícia Federal (PF), or Federal Police, is under the Minis-
try of Justice. The domestic roles of the armed forces in Brazil are de-
fined in the Constitution of 1988, in Article 142, and in subsequent laws. 
The conditions are very precisely defined in Complementary Law 97 of 9 
June 1999. Specifically, a state governor, who is responsible for security 
in the state, can make a request to the president of the Republic that the 
armed forces be used to support the police (Mendes 2012: 19–27). 
The armed forces have been used since 1988 in Rio de Janeiro State 
to support local police in Pacification Police Units (UPP), in an attempt 
to control drug traffickers and other criminal elements in 38 shantytowns 
favelas. On 21 March 2013, the governor of Rio de Janeiro, Sérgio Cabral, 
asked the federal government to support local police in seeking control 
of the Maré favela in Rio de Janeiro, in preparation for the FIFA World 
Cup. Justice Minister José Eduardo Cardozo announced that the armed 
forces would support local police to “guarantee law and order.”  
In addition, the Brazilian armed forces have police powers along the 
border, to within 150 kilometers from the border. This police power is 
exercised especially in the Amazon, where the Brazilian Army is often 
the sole representative of the State along the porous borders. The total 
amount of land that corresponds to the 150-kilometer corridor is actually 
larger than any other single country in South America apart from Argen-
tina.  
In the strictest interpretation of this prerogative, as defined by Ste-
pan above, Brazil’s military rates low. However, the continued use of the 
military in police functions counters the spirit of civilian control in this 
area. This blurred line between external defense and internal security is 
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not unique to Brazil, of course, but the push-pull that leads to the mili-
tary’s involvement in state and local policing emphasizes the need for 
institutional strengthening.  
Prerogative #9: Role in military promotions. According to Stepan, 
this prerogative is low when the:  
Legislature has discussed and approved promotion law. Profes-
sional military promotion board makes recommendation to Cabi-
net-level officials who in turn make recommendations to [the] ex-
ecutive. Executive not typically constrained in selection of major 
policy-making posts (Stepan 1988: 96) . 
Brazil’s current rating in this respect is moderate. In Complementary 
Law no. 136 of 25 August 2010, the authority to recommend general 
officers for promotion and assignment was transferred from the service 
commanders to the minister of defense, who recommends the promo-
tions to the president for nomination. The services do submit their pro-
motion lists to the minister of defense, who rarely changes the list, but 
does retain veto power (Skora Rosty 2011: 14). 
Prerogative #10: Role in state enterprises. To Stepan, this preroga-
tive is low when “Only exceptionally does an active-duty military officer 
head a state enterprise” (Stepan 1988: 97). In Brazil, this is currently low. 
Fundamentally, the state enterprise sector has been significantly de-
creased in size and importance (Fishlow 2011: 50–61). An example of 
this is Embraer (Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica), which was created 
in 1969 as a government-controlled aircraft manufacturer. In December 
1994, Embraer was privatized under President Fernando Henrique Car-
doso in “one of the most successful instances of neoliberal privatization 
policy” (Gonzales 2012). Today, active-duty officers do not head state 
enterprises as sinecures. Rather than providing jobs to senior officers, 
politicians are putting their own people into the senior positions as re-
wards or to seal political bargains. They are mainly PT or close political 
allies.  
Prerogative #11: Role in legal system. According to Stepan, this 
prerogative is low when the:  
Military have almost no legal jurisdiction outside of narrowly de-
fined internal offenses against military discipline. In all areas out-
side this domain, civilians and military are subject to civil laws and 
civil courts (Stepan 1988: 97). 
Brazil’s rating here is low. Although the military still has its own legal 
system, its writ does not extend beyond, to civilian areas, except in that 
which specifically concerns crimes against the military organization. Also, 
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this separate system is currently being scrutinized, with the head of the 
Federal Supreme Tribunal (the highest civilian court) criticizing the mili-
tary system.8 Further, due to the powers of the Ministério Público (Public 
Ministry), to be discussed below, the powers of all government entities, 
including the armed forces, are under scrutiny.  
In sum, Brazil is clearly a consolidated democracy and operates sim-
ilarly to other consolidated democracies. Furthermore, the military pre-
rogatives outlined by Alfred Stepan more than 25 years ago, have been 
whittled down substantially, again demonstrating that Brazil operates 
similarly to other democracies, this time in the realm of civil–military 
relations. The prerogatives were useful in describing the role of the mili-
tary in non-democratic regimes, and during the process of transition, but 
are less useful during consolidation. And, most importantly for the pur-
poses of this article, they focus exclusively on control. As Stepan states:  
[F]or our purposes, the dimension of military institutional prerog-
atives refers to those areas where, whether challenged or not, the 
military as an institution assumes they have an acquired right or 
privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its 
internal governance, to play a role within extramilitary areas within 
the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the 
state and political or civil society (Stepan 1988: 93; emphasis add-
ed). 
Democratic civilian control is one thing, but the ability of the Brazilian 
military to fulfill roles and missions is another. We believe that the 
framework presented below allows us to better analyze the main ele-
ments of civil–military relations in contemporary Brazil, including not 
only civilian control, but also military effectiveness and efficiency.  
The Absence of Civilian Incentives as Brazil 
“Has No Enemies” 
While the civilian politicians have clear incentives to diminish military 
prerogatives, and thereby strengthen the democracy as well as increase 
their own powers, there are currently no perceived major threats requir-
ing military capabilities. A widely held perception is that Brazil has no 
enemies. Brazil is considered a “geopolitically satisfied” country with no 
                                                 
8  We are beholden to Angela Moreira Domingues da Silva for her invaluable 
information on this topic. Her doctoral dissertation, listed in the references, is 
on the topic of military justice.  
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major border disputes with its neighbors. This is significant, considering 
that Brazil shares a border with ten countries in South America. Also 
significant is the fact that the “geopolitically frustrated” countries in 
South America, which include at least Argentina (Falklands/Malvinas), 
Bolivia (exit to the sea, or salida al mar), and Venezuela (territorial claims 
to the Essequibo River), are not “frustrated” in relation to Brazil. Thus, 
Brazil occupies an enviable position in the world: it shares borders with 
many nations, but has no major geopolitical issues with any of them.  
Furthermore, Brazil’s rivalry with Argentina has largely dissipated. 
The rivalry peaked in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the military re-
gimes in both countries viewed each other’s missile and nuclear pro-
grams with profound suspicion. Competition also extended to riverine 
resources, as Brazil’s bid for hydroelectric power along the Paraná River 
was met with protests by the Argentine government. Brazil’s defense 
posture at the time was driven in large measure by its rivalry with Argen-
tina. In the final years of the military regimes and especially under civilian 
presidents, Brazil and Argentina began to cooperate in trade and even in 
the nuclear and missile arenas, creating an almost textbook example of 
cooperation. Today, together in UNASUR, Argentina and Brazil enjoy 
mostly harmonious relations. 
This privileged position is vividly captured in a blunt statement in a 
March 2002 interview with Brazil’s Minister of Defense at the time, José 
Viegas Filho. In response to the question, “Is Brazil immune to terror-
ism?” he stated:  
No one can say that they are immune to terrorism. But if you were 
to draw up a list of countries that are vulnerable to this problem, 
Brazil would certainly be in one of the lowest rankings. Brazil has 
no enemies. There is not one country in the world that hates us or 
is prejudiced against us (Correio Brasiliense 2003). 
Current corroboration for this view can be found in the END of 2008, 
which states in the introduction: “Brazil is a peaceful country, by tradi-
tion and conviction. It lives in peace with its neighbors” (Ministério de 
Defesa 2008: 8). And, in the same Defense Strategy, under the guidelines 
section: “Presently, Brazil does not have any enemies” (Ministério de 
Defesa 2008: 16). If Brazil has no enemies, then why would citizens vote 
for politicians who say they are going to use tax-generated funds for 
national security and defense when there are so many other demands in 
the socio-economic areas? We think this point is clearly illustrated in the 
retrospect of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s two terms in of-
fice. In Brazil 1994–2002: The Era of the Real, only five of the 397 pages 
are devoted to defense (Presidência da República 2002). The overwhelm-
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ing emphasis in this retrospect is on social and economic progress. It 
must also be remembered that President Cardoso created the MOD in 
1999, with important implications for asserting civilian control as noted 
above under prerogative #1. 
There is a widely held consensus among the elite and the general 
population about the country’s peaceful vocation. As Luis Bitencourt 
and Alcides Costa Vaz state in the executive summary of their report on 
Brazilian Strategic Culture:  
Peace is thus the strategic and cultural norm; it involves active en-
gagement by the State via alliances, diplomacy, economic devel-
opments, and trade partnerships. The Brazilian National Defense 
Strategy underscores and builds perceptions of security upon 
peace and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. It is remarkable that 
the first word in the Brazilian National Defense Strategy of 2008 
is ‘peace’. This key document states that ‘peace is the main goal of 
this strategy.’ In general, Brazilians believe that they are a peaceful 
people, and that peace is an ingrained cultural value (Bitencourt 
and Costa Vaz 2009: 4). 
The view of peace as a vocation is supported by the public’s general 
perception. As the Pew Global Attitudes Project states:  
Brazilians also have an upbeat view of how their country is per-
ceived abroad. Eight-in-ten believe that people in other countries 
around the world generally like Brazil, while only 18% say Brazil is 
generally disliked. Among the 22 counties included in the spring 
2010 Pew Global Attitudes survey, Brazilians are among the most 
likely to think their country is well-regarded by others around the 
globe (Pew Research Center 2010: 17–18). 
These peaceful perceptions, which are widely shared by all social strata in 
Brazil, hold important implications for the use of the armed forces, and 
other security institutions, and for civil–military relations in general. 
There are minimal incentives for civilian politicians to be concerned 
about national defense and security issues. As Brazilian Army Colonel 
Skora Rosty stated, “[…] the media and public opinion are excessively 
critical about spending money on defense matters” (Skora Rosty 2011: 
12). Domestically, the country is a consolidated democracy, including in 
its civil–military relations. Internationally, while the country may have 
vague or ambiguous aspirations, there is minimal threat perception that 
might motivate increased attention to the armed forces. This positive 
perception of Brazil and its global situation holds important implications 
for the commitment of resources – attention, political capital, money, 
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and personnel – to the security sector. These facts, centered on this ar-
gument, are delineated below in terms of our framework for the analysis 
of civil–military relations.  
A Framework for the Analysis of Civil–Military 
Relations 
It is easy to understand why politicians and scholars would initially focus 
on civil–military relations from a single perspective, as exclusively demo-
cratic control of armed forces, if we recall the classic dilemma captured 
in the phrase: “Who guards the guardians?” Any armed force strong 
enough to defend a country is also strong enough to take over a gov-
ernment; that is, to stage a coup. This is the assumption behind most 
analyses of civil–military relations, which not only leads into military 
governments, but also out of them. The issue is all the more important 
in those states, which includes Brazil, where the military served as the 
government between the years of 1964 and 1985. However, control 
alone is not sufficient to begin to describe and analyze contemporary 
civil–military relations. For this reason, the authors have formulated a 
framework that includes not only control, but also effectiveness and 
efficiency. This framework has been put forth in five refereed publica-
tions, in which it has been applied to the United States and four South 
American countries, utilized by Chilean scholars in the analysis of civil–
military relations in Chile (Flisfisch and Robledo 2012), and even figures 
in President-elect Michelle Bachelet’s Programa de Gobierno, 2014–2018, 
Chile de todos (Bachelet 2013: 151). 
Control 
In order to put the first dimension (control) on an empirical basis, we 
conceptualize democratic civilian control in terms of the following con-
trol mechanisms: (1) institutions, (2) oversight, and (3) professional 
norms. Institutional control mechanisms involve providing direction and 
guidance for the security forces that may be exercised through organic 
laws and other regulations that empower the civilian leadership and civil-
ian-led organizations with professional staff. The latter normally includes 
a ministry of defense for the military, one or more committees in the 
legislature that deal with policies and budgets, and a chain of authority 
for civilians to determine roles and missions, such as a National Security 
Council-type organization (Bruneau 2011: 50–76). 
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Oversight must be exercised by the civilian leadership in order to 
keep track of what the security forces do, and to ensure they are follow-
ing the direction and guidance they have received from the civilian poli-
ticians. Professional norms are institutionalized through legally approved 
and transparent policies for recruitment, education, training, and promo-
tion in the armed forces in accordance with the goals of the democrati-
cally elected civilian leadership, thereby internalizing the previous two 
control mechanisms (that is, institutions and oversight). 
These three sets of control mechanisms can be utilized by demo-
cratically elected civilians to exercise control over security forces. Indeed, 
in well-established democracies, they are. However, as we believe there is 
more involved in security and democracy, we must also consider effec-
tiveness and efficiency.  
Effectiveness 
It must be acknowledged that it is extremely difficult to measure effec-
tiveness. While there are (limited) cases in which the effectiveness of the 
security sector in fulfilling roles and missions can be demonstrated, we 
believe that effectiveness is generally best determined by whether the 
security institutions are prepared to fulfill any or all of the roles assigned 
to them. We have identified six major roles and missions that contempo-
rary armed forces implement. They are: (1) fight and be prepared to fight 
wars, (2) fight and be prepared to fight internal wars, (3) counter-
terrorism, (4) support police forces in fighting crime, (5) peace support 
operations, and (6) humanitarian assistance (see Matei 2013: 26–38).  
War-fighting is the one role that may have obvious benchmarks of 
success, and for which preparedness can be empirically evaluated to 
some degree through tactical and larger-scale exercises. Finding realistic 
measures of success for other roles is difficult. Even regarding war-
fighting, when countries prepare to defend themselves or their allies 
against external enemies, the greatest indicator of success will probably 
be the avoidance of armed combat, whether this is due to the perception 
that the defenders possess overwhelming force, success in the use of 
diplomatic tools, or the integration of an aggressor into an alliance that 
mitigates ambitions or grievances.  
The difficulty of proving effectiveness can be seen below. The best 
recent example is probably the Cold War, which never became particu-
larly “hot” directly between the United States and the Soviet Union 
thanks to the mutual deterrence imposed by the two sides’ nuclear arse-
nals. Effectiveness in other roles and missions is very opaque and diffi-
cult to measure. Internal wars have deep and historical, economic, politi-
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cal, and social causes that cannot be resolved by force of arms alone. 
Fighting tends to drag on, and it is all but impossible for either side to 
ever declare “victory.” Global terrorism differs from internal conflict in 
that the former is a tactic and has no finite locale such as a state to de-
fend or defeat. Therefore, the fight against global terrorism can be con-
sidered successful when no attack occurs. However, it is impossible to 
know whether the absence of an attack was due to effective security 
measures or because the terrorists simply chose not to attack. Nor is 
there a clear moment when it will be safe to say that terrorism has been 
defeated. Fighting crime is ongoing, as is the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. Neither criminals nor natural disasters are ever going to dis-
appear. These challenges are a matter of anticipation, preparation, and 
mitigation, with the goal of keeping the level of crime or loss of life and 
property within acceptable limits (leaving aside the question of defining 
the term “acceptable”). With regard to peace support operations, the 
problem is similar. If conflicts between parties arise due to religious, 
ethnic, or political grievances, and require intervention by foreign securi-
ty forces, the troops’ presence in itself will not resolve the fundamental 
causes behind the fighting. Rather, they may provide some stability, sepa-
rate the antagonists, and allow space for negotiations.  
We must be realistic about what is required in order for security 
measures to be effective, as well as our ability to measure this effective-
ness and to explain success or failure. Under these circumstances, based 
on our research and studies of what is necessary, although perhaps not 
sufficient, we posit three basic requirements for security forces to be 
effective in fulfilling any of the six abovementioned roles and missions. 
First, there must be a plan, which may take the form of a strategy or 
even a doctrine. Examples include national security strategies, national 
military strategies, white papers on security and defense, strategies for 
disaster relief, counterterrorism, and the like. Second, there must be 
structures and processes to both formulate and implement the plans. 
These include ministries of defense, national security councils, joint or 
general staffs, or other institutions that facilitate cooperation between 
civilians and the military, jointness and/or inter-agency coordination, as 
well as international cooperation.9 Third, a country must commit re-
sources (money, basically) to ensure it has sufficient equipment, trained 
forces, and other assets to implement the assigned roles and missions. It 
                                                 
9  Bruneau has dealt with the importance of these institutions in the US in focus-
ing specifically on the innovations of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorgan-
ization Act of 1986. See Bruneau 2011: 80–87. 
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is difficult to imagine how a country could implement any of the above-
mentioned roles and missions without all three of these components.10 
Efficiency 
Efficiency in the use of resources refers to the ability to fulfill assigned 
roles and missions at an optimum cost. Measuring efficiency in the secu-
rity sector is complicated by a variety of issues, including the variety of 
roles and missions; the difficulty of establishing measures of efficiency 
for any one function, let alone a combination of them; and the methodo-
logical challenges inherent in measuring efficiency. Therefore, efficiency 
represents in most cases a “red herring” in the field of security, in that its 
use, mainly in the field of defense economics, includes a great many 
undefined assumptions. Notwithstanding these challenges, we believe 
there is still a need for a set of institutions to allocate and oversee the 
application of resources as an integral element of democratic accounta-
bility and transparency.  
Before addressing how to measure efficiency, it is first necessary to 
clarify the conceptual distinctions between effectiveness and efficiency, 
as the terms are often used interchangeably. A review of the literature in 
organization theory, political transitions and defense economics shows 
that terms such as effectiveness, efficiency, efficacy, and cost-effective-
ness are often conflated and used inconsistently. While there is general 
agreement that effectiveness is the capacity to implement the policies 
formulated, with the desired results, efficiency (a concept that is strongly 
associated with physics, economics, and organizational theory) refers to 
getting the most out of a given input. In other words, efficiency in the 
use of resources refers to the ability to fulfill the assigned roles and mis-
sions at the optimum cost.  
What can be measured in the area of security are the so-called hard 
data, such as the number of tanks or airplanes produced, or the number 
of troops trained or equipped at a given cost. What these indicators tell 
us about the efficiency of security, however, is at the very least limited 
                                                 
10  Although it is difficult to assess effectiveness, what comes out clearly from the 
preceding discussion is the importance of such institutions as a ministry of de-
fense and a joint or general staff; these are critical to how well the security forc-
es work. There is evidence from new, and even older NATO countries, such as 
Portugal and Spain, that they have created robust institutions, which are staffed 
by civilians who offer some level of expertise, and who can count on some ca-
reer stability within the ministries, security councils, or other security-related in-
stitutions. These countries were compelled from outside (by NATO member-
ship requirements) to recruit civilians and give them stable positions.  
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and probably misleading. Nevertheless, policy makers may refer to them 
in order to make, or in most cases rationalize, decisions. All of the mate-
rial that we have discovered in researching on measures of efficiency in 
the areas of national security and defense is based upon certain assump-
tions. Some scholars may be willing to make these assumptions, but we 
are not.  
Rejecting pseudo-scientific methodologies to arrive at a precise fig-
ure for national security and defense, the use of public funds in a democ-
racy demands that government agencies carry out systematic assessments 
of program costs and results. From Bruneau’s research in the United 
States, he found that there are extremely extensive and elaborate institu-
tional mechanisms to do precisely this (Bruneau 2013b: 39–47). These 
include, on the congressional side, the Government Accountability Of-
fice (GAO), Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Research Of-
fice, special auditing bodies such as the Special Inspector-General for 
Iraq Reconstruction, the Special Inspector-General for Afghan Recon-
struction, and congressional hearings in general and via the Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reform; and, on the executive side, vari-
ous inspectors general and the Office of Management and Budget. There 
is a very extensive spectrum of oversight mechanisms to assess not only 
the use of public funds, but also the success of government in achieving 
goals. Clearly, the most important is the GAO, which is the United 
States’ supreme audit institution (SAI).  
Brazil in Terms of the Framework 
Democratic Civilian Control  
Institutional Basis: Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
The MOD was established fourteen years after Brazil’s democratic tran-
sition, with the passage of Complementary Law 97 on 9 June 1999. Be-
tween its creation in 1999 and the appointment of Nelson Jobim as min-
ister of defense on 25 July 2007, the MOD was under very weak and 
erratic leadership, and did not develop as an institution. Since the ouster 
of Nelson Jobim by President Dilma Rousseff on 4 August 2011, the 
MOD has been headed by Ambassador Celso Amorim, who was foreign 
minister during both of the Lula da Silva administrations (2002–2010). 
Ambassador Amorim is a highly regarded bureaucrat with no back-
  Civil–Military Relations in Brazil 127 
 
ground in defense or national security.11 Even under Minister Jobim, 
however, a civilian cadre of advisors was never established. There is no 
career track within the MOD, or the required concurso to fill positions, 
which results in civilians having minimal roles in the MOD. A constant 
theme in Brazilian Colonel Skora Rosty’s Strategy Research Paper is the 
lack of prepared civilians to deal with security and defense in Brazil 
(Skora Rosty 2011: 8, 13, 21). Consequently, while Minister Amorim may 
be excellent as an individual, cabinet member, and strategic thinker, he is 
almost alone as a civilian in the Ministry of Defense.12 
However, the lack of civilian expertise is less of an issue for demo-
cratic civilian control than for effectiveness, as we will see below, as 
there is a national security council-like institution, the Gabinete de Se-
gurança Institucional (GSI) Secretariat for Institutional Security. This is 
an institutional mechanism whereby the democratically elected president 
exercises control over the security sector, including the armed forces (see 
Bruneau, Matei, and Sakoda 2009). There is also a series of other over-
sight institutions whereby the democratically elected executive and legis-
lative bodies can enforce accountability, including the defense or security 
sector. Probably the most important of these is the Ministério Público 
(MP) or Federal Public Ministry.13  
Oversight: Public Ministry  
The Federal Public Ministry has received a great deal of attention in 
democratic Brazil as a mechanism to counter the well-known tradition of 
elite and government impunity. Albert Fishlow, a highly-respected for-
eign observer of Brazil, citing Fabio Kerche, wrote:  
[…] the Public Ministry plays an important role in Brazilian politi-
cal life and ‘is singular because it combines elements – autonomy, 
instruments of action, discretion and full array of attributes – that 
are not common in institutions with few characteristics of account-
ability’. This structure has become an integral part of the institu-
                                                 
11  According to Admiral Mario Cesar Flores, then Foreign Minister Celso Amo-
rim did not participate in the drafting of the Estratégia Nacional de Defesa. Estado 
de São Paulo 31 August 2011: A-2. 
12  For his thoughts on Brazil and international security, see Amorim 2013. 
13  In addition to Sadek and Cavalcanti (2003), see also the works of Matthew M. 
Taylor and Vinícius C. Buranelli (2007). They review the roles of four of what 
they term “Midlevel Institutions of Accountability in Brazil”, one of which is 
the Ministéro Público. The importance of the Public Ministry in intelligence 
oversight, which is even more difficult than oversight over the armed forces, is 
dealt with in Joanisval Brito Gonçalves (2012).  
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tions undergirding an evolving democracy (Fishlow 2011: 23; Em-
phasis in original). 
The Public Ministry is extremely powerful and autonomous in defending 
the public interest. All who are in public life in Brazil are aware of its 
immense powers, and it can act as a deterrent to public abuse, including 
in the area of national security and defense. This institution is quite rare 
in the world and must be taken into consideration when analyzing the 
autonomy and activities of any public institution, including the armed 
forces and intelligence agencies.  
Professional Military Education 
Professional Military Education (PME) is recognized in Brazil as being 
of high quality and is provided through an elaborate system at several 
levels. The three service academies concentrate on technical training. 
Further professional training, as well as education in policy and strategy, 
is offered at the intermediate schools. A higher level of education is 
available at the traditional Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) Higher War 
College, in which senior military officers mix with civilians. However, 
there is limited joint education, as senior leadership in all of the services 
has resisted a broader joint education program.  
Civilian control over PME is exerted in two ways. First, everyone 
who enters the military academies must pass a concurso, the content and 
evaluations of which are controlled by civilians. Secondly, the granting of 
some autonomy to the armed services themselves in PME is stipulated in 
the civilian-formulated and interpreted, via the MEC, Leis de Diretrizes e 
Bases de Educação Nacional, in Article 83. Furthermore, virtually all of 
the details are specified in specific agreements (portarias) between the 
armed services and the MEC.  
In sum, democratic civilian control over the armed forces in Brazil 
is exercised by a wide variety of institutions, the most important of 
which are not specifically designed for this purpose, but are instead part 
of a vast array of institutions that exercise oversight and accountability 
over public bureaucracies. This is consistent with Max Weber’s work on 
bureaucracies, and the more modern Weberian variant of New Institu-
tionalism, which we have outlined in the introduction to our edited book 
(Bruneau and Tollefson 2006: 5–8). While the relationship between bu-
reaucratic structure and civil–military relations is important in all cases, 
Brazil’s path is different from other democratic regimes that were previ-
ously under military tutelage. Civilian control of the military and other 
security institutions such as Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (ABIN) are 
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part of the ample set of institutions in which democratically elected civil-
ians control all sectors of the state in Brazil. Recognizing this fact re-




In December 2008, the MOD formulated and President Lula decreed the 
Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (END). However, because the END was 
created by decree and thus did not go through the Brazilian Congress 
(according to the Brazilian legal-administrative system), there was no 
initial requirement for Congressional funding. It was not until 12 Sep-
tember 2013 that the Brazilian Congress approved the END, National 
Defense Policy (PND), and Defense White Book (Ministério da Defesa 
2013). The END does not include any reference to implementation 
beyond purely bureaucratic measures. The more recent Livro Branco de 
Defesa Nacional of 2012 is a 275-page review of the institutions, roles, and 
missions of actors in the defense sector. The Política Nacional de Defe-
sa, PND, is a succinct ten-page statement on goals, institutions, and the 
international environment. It is noteworthy that the Brazilian govern-
ment has, under PT presidencies, elaborated and published these three 
documents.  
To what extent do these documents reflect a strategy? Hew Stra-
chan, in his article “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,” which was published 
in Survival stated:  
In the ideal model of civil–military relations, the democratic head 
of state sets out his or her policy and armed forces coordinate the 
means to enable its achievement. The reality is that this process-a 
process called strategy-is iterative, a dialogue where ends also re-
flect means, and where the result – also called strategy – is a com-
promise between the ends of policy and the military means availa-
ble to implement it (Strachan 2005: 52). 
If we apply Strachan’s formulation as a guide, the three Brazilian docu-
ments do not amount to a strategy. Nonetheless, the documents do 
reflect a serious effort towards developing a strategy. Meeting the Stra-
chan standard will require greater focus and time. 
                                                 
14  For this reason, we are doubly grateful to a very large group of Brazilian policy-
makers and scholars who responded to our numerous queries for explanations 
on state oversight institutions.  
  130 Thomas Charles Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson 
 
Institutions 
In line with Strachan’s quote regarding the iterative process between the 
civilian decision-makers and the armed forces, and based on comparative 
studies, we believe that there is a need for an institutional basis for bring-
ing the civilians and the leaders of the armed forces together. While the 
MOD, as discussed above, formally links the executive (the civilian pres-
ident in the case of Brazil) to the armed forces, we find that increasing 
numbers of countries have found it necessary to create, or recreate, joint 
staffs to bring the civilian-led MOD into structured contact with the 
armed forces. Portugal, for example, created a joint staff in 2009 (Bru-
neau and Matei 2013: 277–282). 
In 2010, Brazil established a joint operational military structure as 
part of a more general reform of national security and defense institu-
tions. The Lei Complementar 136 of 25 August 2010 specified the roles of 
the MOD and created the Estado-Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas 
(EMCFA, The Armed Forces Joint Command). The minister of defense 
at the time, Nelson Jobim, proposed a set of four laws, passed by the 
Congress, that provided for an overall updating of roles, missions, and 
structures. A pending question now is whether the joint structure will 
work since Minister Jobim has departed and the officers at the top levels 
of the three services are four-star, and their positions mirrors to some 
degree the continuing structure of the services. From our most recent 
information, development of the EMCFA is definitely a work in pro-
gress.  
Resources 







GDP Spent on 
Defense 
Brazil 2,374.42 30.62 1.29% 
China 8,277.89 126.29 1.53% 
France 2,640.27 51.27 1.94% 
India 1,996.48 44.23 2.22% 
Russian Federa-
tion 
1,917.68 58.96 3.08% 
United King-
dom 
2,512.69 60.95 2.43% 
United States 15,938.18 656.21 4.12% 
Source:  Adapted from Jane’s Defense Budgets. Accessed 27 May 2013. 
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Table 3:  Brazil, BRIC Nations, and UN Security Council Nations: Percent-
age of Defense Budgets Spent on Military Personnel 





Russian Federation 57% 
United Kingdom 31% 
United States 24% 
Source:  Adapted from Jane’s Defense Budgets. Accessed 27 May 2013. 
As Table 2 shows, Brazil commits a relatively low percentage of its GDP 
to defense: 1.29 percent. And, as Table 3 shows, percentage of personnel 
costs in this budget (73 percent) is very high compared to other coun-
tries. The comparison group is the BRIC and the permanent members of 
the United Nations Security Council, to which the country aspires. As 
stated in Jane’s assessment in 2013:  
Personnel welfare spending consumes a large share of the Brazilian 
defense budget: fully 73.2% in 2013, when counting wages, salaries, 
pensions and social security payments. This rate is unlikely to 
change significantly over the coming five years. Brazil has historical-
ly provided generous benefits to both its serving personnel and their 
families (Jane’s Defense Budgets. Accessed 27 May 2013). 
Brazil’s high level of personnel costs in the defense budget leaves policy-
makers with little room to maneuver in terms of non-personnel costs, 
including procurement. Plans for the Brazilian Navy to purchase new 
ships, an item highlighted in the 2008 END, were put on hold in 2011. 
The much-heralded nuclear submarine project was first discussed as early 
as 1989 (Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly 1989). As Jane’s states, defense 
was one of the hardest-hit ministries in the 2011 USD 30 billion budget 
cut, which affected procurement significantly. In 2011, procurement was 
to receive about 11.7 percent of the defense budget, down from the 13.2 
percent in 2010. About 30 percent of the procurement funds were fro-
zen due to the budget cut. There is wide awareness in the Brazilian Navy 
that it lacks the assets to be able to implement the missions defined in 
the END, including the so-called Blue Amazon (José Augusto Abreu de 
Moura 2013: 56). The continuing budget limits on procurements is not 
lost on the Federation of Industries of São Paulo (Federação das In-
dústrias do Estado do São Paulo, FIESP) which publishes a Panorama 
Defesa Comercial and laments the lack of opportunity for Brazilian indus-
tries to do more in defense due to a shortage of funds (FIESP 2014). 
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Efficiency 
Through Bruneau’s research on the United States and six other OECD 
countries, he found that the supreme audit institutions (SAIs) provide a 
critically important oversight function, including in national security and 
defense. Brazil is traditionally known as o estado cartorial, or the notary 
office State, and the scope and penetration of the State is quite apparent 
to its residents. The situation is similar to that concerning public financ-
es, including in defense. The SAI in Brazil is the Tribunal de Contas da 
União (TCU) or Court of Audits, and it is extremely powerful and rigor-
ous in terms of ensuring that government funds, including in the areas of 
national defense, are used according to the extensive and detailed guid-
ance from both the executive and the legislature. This institution has 
authority over the implementation of Lei de Licitação, 8666, which is simi-
lar to US Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR, which is large and totally 
authoritative regarding contracting out), and the Lei de Responsabilidade 
Fiscal, which stipulates further detail on the allocation and use of public 
funds. The military services have their own inspectors-general, who ulti-
mately report to the TCU. In short, Brazil does have a very robust insti-
tutional basis for efficiency in the use of resources.15 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, our argument is that Brazil is a fully-consolidated democ-
racy, with a high level of democratic civilian control over the armed 
forces. That control is exercised by a wide variety of institutions, the 
most important of which are not specifically designed for this purpose, 
but are part of a vast array of institutions that exercise oversight and 
accountability over public bureaucracies.  
Civilian control of the military and other security institutions such 
as Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (ABIN) are part of the ample set of 
institutions, whereby democratically elected civilians control all sectors of 
the State in Brazil. Recognizing this fact requires in-house insight and 
attention to identify these institutions and their roles. Separately, and 
given the absence of a credible civilian presence in the MOD, the role of 
the Ministério Público in exercising oversight over the defense sector in 
terms of activities and of the MEC in education are crucial to exert con-
                                                 
15  Taylor and Buranelli (2007) have a section on the TCU, but we obtained most 
of our information on its relevance for the military in interviews at the Brazilian 
Naval War College, in Rio de Janeiro, and the Casa Civil, or Civilian Household 
for the Presidency of Brazil, in Brasília.  
  Civil–Military Relations in Brazil 133 
 
trol. The lack of civilian expertise is important in the dimension of effec-
tiveness as there are few civilians in the bureaucracy who know enough 
to be able to formulate strategies and interact credibly with the EMCFA. 
It is ironic that while there is a dearth of competent civilians in the MOD 
due to the absence of a career path and the required concurso, a cadre of 
civilians interested in defense topics is emerging in academia and other 
sectors. In the bureaucratic realm, there is a substantial lag in the special-
ization of civilians in defense, especially compared with the level of spe-
cialization seen in other arenas such as economics, finance, trade, and 
social welfare. Also, the relatively few resources that are invested in the 
defense sector are primarily directed to military personnel themselves. 
The military are both under democratic control and relatively well cared 
for in terms of salaries and benefits.  
What next? While the relationship between bureaucratic structure 
and civil–military relations is always important, Brazil’s path seems to be 
different from other democratic regimes that were previously under 
military tutelage. Further studies could examine that relationship utilizing 
cases such as Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Peru. What is necessary is 
an analysis that goes beyond mere democratic civilian control of the 
military to include the effectiveness and efficiency associated with that 
control.  
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Relações Civis-Militares No Brasil: Uma Reavaliação  
Resumo: Este artigo analisa as relações entre civis e militares no Brasil, a 
partir de uma estrutura que concentra-se nas instituições, não só do pon-
to de vista do controle civil democrático, mas também do relativo a efi-
cácia e a eficiência militar. O artigo argumenta que o controle civil de-
mocrático sobre as forças armadas no Brasil é exercido por uma grande 
variedade de mecanismos, muitos dos quais não foram projetados espe-
cificamente para esta finalidade, mas fazem parte de um vasto conjunto 
de instituições que exercem o controle e fiscalização sobre as burocracias 
públicas em geral. Prerrogativas militares que outrora eram altas, agora 
são moderadas ou baixas, e não existe, atualmente, preocupação específi-
ca com o controle civil sobre as forças armadas. Permanecem, entretan-
to, várias dúvidas com relação à eficácia das forças armadas. O artigo 
também ressalta importância de que civis assumam responsabilidades 
mais evidentes na defesa, uma vez que já têm assumido responsabilida-
des em praticamente todas as outras áreas da política governamental.  
Palavras-chave: Brasil, as relações entre civis e militares, eficácia militar, 
consolidação democrática  
